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When scholars write about rabbinic capital punishment, they tend to cite
one well-known text from the Mishnah, a second-century C.E. Hebrew-
language law code:
The Sanhedrin [Jewish court] that kills once in seven years is called
destructive. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: Once in seventy years.
Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: If we had been in the Sanhedrin,
no one would have ever been killed. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel
says: Even they multiply murderers in Israel.
This text censures the rabbinic court that executes with anything nearing
frequency, and two Rabbis, Tarfon and Akiva, claim that they would have
never executed anyone a all. A dissenting comment from Rabban Shimon
ben Gamliel argues that such abolitionism would have had disastrous
social consequences by eliminating the deterrence that the death penalty
allegedly provides. Many scholars of the last century, frequently omitting
the last comment, concluded from this text and others that the ancient
* I would like to thank Steven Fraade for inviting me to participate in the Nomos and Narrative
conference, Timothy Lytton for reading and commenting on multiple drafts of this paper, and Caroline
Trowbridge for her careful editing.
1. MISHNAH, Makkot Chapter One, Mishnah Ten. The Mishnah was edited by Rabbi Judah the
Patriarch in the land of Israel, at that time controlled by the Roman Empire. Tractate Makkot
(Lashes/Flagellation) is the fifth tractate in the order Nezikin (Damages). Tractate Makkot, together
with tractate Sanhedrin (a borrowed Greek work for court) with which Makkot was originally joined,
deals with the rabbinic court system--different kinds of courts, their jurisdiction, and their leadership;
procedures for both property cases and capital cases; and a list of crimes with their parameters and
their punishments. MISHNAH, Makkot 1:10 comes somewhat out of context at the conclusion of the
first chapter of the tractate, which lays out the laws of plotting witnesses, based on Deuteronomy
19:16-20.
For an introduction to classical rabbinic literature and the major scholarly works written on it, see
HERMANN LEBERECHT STRACK & GONTER STEMBERGER, INTRODUCTION TO THE TALMUD AND
MIDRASH (Markus Bockmuehl trans., 1996).
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Rabbis were opposed to capital punishment.2 The Rabbis would have
completely abolished the death penalty, the argument goes, if they had not
inherited it from the Bible. According to many proponents of this
historical reconstruction, the Rabbis represent an advance in moral
thinking over the relative barbarism of the Bible.
This paper first explores the contours and context of this scholarship and
then offers a new approach that uses Robert Cover's work to rethink
rabbinic law's relationship to violence. I draw on two of Cover's essays,
Nomos and Narrative and Violence and the Word, to read another rabbinic
legal text, Mishnah Sanhedrin Chapter Six, which describes the rabbinic
procedure for criminal execution. I employ Cover's concepts of word,
role, and deed, and specifically his claim that the judge's word is turned
into violent deed though the mediation of roles. Using these concepts, I
suggest that the Mishnah establishes a close relationship between the
rabbinic judge and violence, but at the same time creates some distance
between the two. According to Cover, such strategies are typical of law,
which in order to maintain legitimacy must appear to be capable of
violence yet not unduly eager to resort to it. I suggest that Cover's work,
when applied to rabbinic law, helps to dispel the romanticism of rabbinics
scholarship, even though paradoxically Cover's own discussion of Jewish
law is subject to this very flaw. Finally, I recommend several new
directions that Cover's work might give to scholarship on Jewish law, and
I suggest that rabbinic texts, in turn, might complicate our reading of
Cover.
SCHOLARSHIP ON RABBINIC CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Many social forces helped to produce the scholarship that views the
Rabbis as early opponents of capital punishment. The work of Samuel
Mendelsohn is representative of many of the scholarly trends.3
Mendelsohn, a Lithuanian rabbi who immigrated to the United States and
led congregations in the South, published his Criminal Jurisprudence of
the Ancient Hebrews in Baltimore in 1891.' In this work, Mendelsohn's
2. For other texts, see infra note 23. For a survey of scholarship on the ancient Jewish death
penalty, see YAIR LORBERBAUM, IMAGE OF GOD: HALAKHAH AND AGGADAH 173 n. 11 (2004) and
BETH A. BERKOWITZ, ExEcUTION AND INVENTION: DEATH PENALTY DISCOURSE IN EARLY RABBINIC
AND CHRISTIAN CULTURES (forthcoming 2005).
3. According to Haut, the work was well-received at the time but then dropped out of sight until
the 1960s. See Irwin H. Haut, Introduction to SAMUEL MENDELSOHN, THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE JEWS vi (Sepher-Hermon Press 1991) (1891).
4. On the life of Samuel Mendelsohn, see id. at v-ix. The term from his title and used here,
"ancient Hebrews," is not a neutral choice. In the 1991 edition of Mendelsohn's book, this title phrase
is changed to "Jews." The word "Jews" according to modem parlance is in fact the correct one for
Mendelsohn's purposes: "Ancient Hebrews" suggests biblical Israel, while Mendelsohn is clearly
referring to rabbinic Judaism. In using the term "Hebrew," Mendelsohn is using the preferred term of
nineteenth-century American Jews, who understood "Jew" to be a less polite designation. See Naomi
W. Cohen, Antisemitism in the Gilded Age: The Jewish View, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON JEWISH-
[Vol. 17:125
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argument is that rabbinic criminal law is at. once effective and humane:
"[T]he system of criminal jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews, as
recorded in the Talmud and in contemporaneous Rabbinic literature, was
one which enforced civil order and secured the safety and peace of society
by mildness and consideration, tempering justice with a love of humanity,
and all this in an age of savagery and violence, of wars and uncertainty..."
In his introduction, Mendelsohn tells his readers explicitly the impetus for
his work. Mendelsohn mournfully describes the Talmud, the culturally
encyclopedic compendium of rabbinic literature roughly spanning the first
half of the first millenium C.E., as "almost a sealed Book" and expresses
his desire to open the Talmud to his American Jewish audiences.6 But he
also expresses his concern to vindicate "the Israelitish people's ancient
literature from the aspersions cast upon it by inimical and, not
unfrequently, ignorant writers." 7 Mendelsohn here seems to be addressing
internal Jewish criticisms of the Talmud that emerged with the modem
Jewish Enlightenment in Europe and continued in modified form in
Reform Judaism.8 But Mendelsohn is also likely referring to Christian
supercessionist criticisms of rabbinic Judaism that it represents a
desiccated form of religion in comparison with its so-called successor,
Christianity.9  In showing that the Talmud manifests a "love for
humanity," Mendelsohn is able to prove this age-old Christian criticism
wrong.
Mendelsohn chooses criminal law as the test case for Judaism's
morality against a backdrop of changing public attitudes toward criminal
punishment in the United States. Criticism of the death penalty in
America can be traced back to the Founding Fathers, and in the 1830s and
1840s penal reform organizations were created.'" The Bible became the
field on which the debates were fought, with each side using it as
justification for their view." l In arguing for the humanitarianism of
CHRISTIAN RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: IMAGERY AND REALITY 128 (Naomi W. Cohen ed.,
1990) (discussing the resonances in late nineteenth-century America of the terms "Semite," "Israelite,"
"Hebrew," and "Jew").
5. MENDELSOHN, supra note 3, at 15.
6. Id. at 23.
7. Id. at3.
8. See JAY HARRIS, How Do WE KNOW THIS? MIDRASH AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF MODERN
JUDAISM 103-72 (1995) (discussing criticisms of classical rabbinic literature by maskilim
["enlightened" Jews] who rejected Judaism altogether and by reformers who worked to adapt Judaism
to the changing social and ideological conditions of modemity).
9. See Louise A. Mayo, The Ambivalent Image: Nineteenth-Century America's Perception of the
Jew, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON JEWISH-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: IMAGERY AND
REALITY 105-26 (Naomi W. Cohen ed., 1990) (discussing negative Christian perceptions of Jews and
Judaism in the United States in Mendelsohn's time).
10. Louis MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865 (1989).
11. For example, see Masur's description of the September 1881 debate between George Barrell
Cheever and Wendell Phillips about the execution of Charles Guiteau, President Garfield's assassin.
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rabbinic criminal execution, Mendelsohn is showing that the Talmud
agrees with the most progressive of contemporary mores according to his
view. Moreover, Mendelsohn's work may have been influenced by the
budding field of sociology, whose founder, tmile Durkheim, was at that
time arguing that society's punishments are a window through which
society's "true nature" can be viewed. 12  But Mendelsohn's choice of
rabbinic criminal law also enables him to respond to the common
Christian charge that the Jews were-and continued to be-responsible
for the execution of Christ. 3 Mendelsohn, in his work on the laws of
rabbinic capital punishment, joins his fellow American Jews in a vigorous
tradition of defending Judaism against its detractors."n As the story of
scholarship on the rabbinic death penalty progresses from the 1800s into
the 1900s and 2000s, backlashes against some of these patterns also
emerge, as well as new patterns responding to changing contexts and
concerns-the establishment of the State of Israel and its opportunities for
Jewish legal expression, and renewed efforts for Jewish-Christian
dialogue.15 But Mendelsohn's motivations for examining the rabbinic
death penalty persist: to defend the Talmud from Jewish and Christian
attacks and to maintain the Talmud's relevance.
Id. at 161.
12. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 109 (George Simpson trans., The
Free Press, 1933) (1893) ("[T]here exists a social solidarity which comes from a certain number of
states of conscience which are common to all the members of the same society .... In determining
what fraction of the juridical system penal law represents, we, at the same time, measure the relative
importance of this solidarity.").
13. Nathaniel Hawthorne's poem The Star of Calvary, is one of many representations of this
view:
Behold 0 Israel! behold,
It is no Human One
That ye have dared to crucify
What evil hath he done?
It is your King, 0 Israel!
The God-begotten Son!
Nathanial Hawthorne, The Star of Calvary, quoted in Mayo, supra note 9, at 107, 109. Naomi Cohen
describes similar accusations of Jews as "Christ-killers" in the 1870's revivalist crusade of Reverend
Dwight L. Moody. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 134. On the persistence of these views into the
twentieth century, see Glock and Stark's sociological study in the 1960s that finds "widespread
acceptance of the belief [among members of contemporary churches] that the Jews overwhelmed
Pilate to bring about the death of Jesus. This is further confirmed by Table 21, which shows that 58
percent of the Protestants and 61 percent of the Roman Catholics picked the Jews as the group 'most
responsible for crucifying Christ."' CHARLES Y. GLOCK & RODNEY STARK, CHRISTIAN BELIEFS AND
ANTI-SEMITISM 52 (1966). Mel Gibson's 2004 film, The Passion, and the controversy it stirred show
the ongoing nature of the politically charged debate over the Jewish role in Jesus' execution.
14. See Sama on the importance of polemical defense to American Jews. Jonathan D. Sarna, The
American Jewish Response to Nineteenth-Century Christian Missions, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON
JEWISH-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: IMAGERY AND REALITY 23 (Naomi W. Cohen
ed., 1990).
15. See supra note 2.
[Vol. 17:125
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MECHANISMS OF RABBINIC LEGAL VIOLENCE
Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva's reluctance to impose the death penalty
notwithstanding, the rabbinic legal canon does include an array of violent
mechanisms of enforcement.16 Mishnah tractates Sanhedrin and Makkot
outline detailed procedures for both capital and corporal punishment.
These texts are strikingly innovative in their lawmaking.17 While the
Bible refers primarily to one method of capital punishment, stoning
(Leviticus 20:2, 27, 24:16; Numbers 15:35; Deuteronomy 13:11, 17:5;
21:21, 22:21), and legislates burning for two crimes (Leviticus 20:14,
21:9), the Rabbis describe four methods of capital punishment, adding
decapitation and strangulation. 8 In the realm of corporal punishment, the
Rabbis delineate not only biblical lashes but a new type of lashes decreed
by order of the Rabbis and imposed in a more severe way than biblical
lashes.19 The Rabbis also institute imprisonment under certain conditions
and create a death penalty tailored specially for priests. 2°  Besides
inventing new kinds of punishment, the Rabbis are also highly creative in
their elaboration of penal procedures. For example, with stoning, instead
of the collective casting of stones assumed by the Bible, the Rabbis
require that the witness to the crime push the convicted criminal from an
elevated platform. 2  While it is the case that many of these punishments
are difficult to implement according to the strictures of rabbinic law, the
punishments nevertheless remain ready for use if proper procedure is
16. 1 speak here primarily of the tannaitic layer of rabbinic literature, dating roughly to the second
century C.E. and emerging from Graeco-Roman Palestine.
17. Systematic research has yet to be done on the innovations of other Bible interpreters in late
antiquity with respect to the Bible's punishments, with the important exception of Aharon Shemesh's
recent work on Qumran's penal legislations. See AHARON SHEMESH, ONASHIM VE-HATA'IM MIN HA-
MIQRA LE-SIFRUT HAZAL [PUNISHMENTS AND SINS FROM SCRIPTURE TO THE RABBI] (2003).
18. Mishnah, Sanhedrin 7:1. For analysis of the innovative character of the four rabbinic death
penalties, see MOSHE HALBERTAL, MAHAPEKHOT PARSHANIYOT BE-HIT'HAVUTAN: ARAKHIM KE-
SHIQULIM PARSHANI'IM BE-MIDRESHEI HALAKHAH [INTERPRETIVE REVOLUTIONS IN THE MAKING:
VALUES AS INTERPRETIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIDRASHEi HALAKHAH] 145-67 (1997); SHEMESH,
supra note 17, at 11-34; and Haim H. Cohn, The Penology of the Talmud, 5 ISRAEL L. REV. 57-
74(1970).
19. MISHNAH, Makkot Chapter 3 legislates lashes with biblical authority. TOSEFTA, Makkot 4:17
describes rabbinic lashes (makkot mardut). Also see Sifre Zuta Masei 35:22, in SIFRE ZUTrA 333-34
(H. Saul Horovitz ed. and comp., Shalem 1992); Tosefta, Nazir 3:15, in THE TOSEFTA [ORDER
NASHIM] 133 (Saul Lieberman, ed. and comp., The Jewish Theological Seminary of America 1995);
PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Nazir 4:3 (53a-b). The legal foundation for rabbinic lashes and other
punishments without biblical mandate is laid in Palestinian Talmud, Hagigah 2:2 (78a), with parallels
in Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 46a and Yevamot 90b. See HANINA BEN MENAHEM, JUDICIAL
DEVIATION IN TALMUDIC LAW: GOVERNED BY MEN, NOT BY RULES 142-49 (1991) (discussing "extra-
legal" penal innovations in rabbinic law); see also MENAHEM ELON, 2 JEWISH LAW: HISTORY,
SOURCES, PRINCIPLES (HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI) 515-19 (Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans.,
1994); Michelle Hammer-Kossoy, Rabbinic Criminal Punishment: Divine Justice in Human Hands
(forthcoming 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with author).
20. MISHNAH, Sanhedrin 9:5-6.
21. MISHNAH, Sanhedrin 6:4.
2005]
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followed.22 Surveying these laws, we are drawn to conclude that legal
violence occupied a great deal of rabbinic energy. Recently, in the wake
of an explosion of scholarship on punishment sparked by Foucault's
Discipline and Punish, rabbinics scholars have begun to give their
attention to this penal system and to what it can tell us about rabbinic
ideologies.23
COVER ON LAW AND VIOLENCE
A parallel to the tendency in past rabbinic scholarship to underplay
violence can be found in modem legal scholarship, which, according to
Sarat and Kearns, had also largely avoided the theme of violence.24
Robert Cover's work can be said to have almost single-handedly altered
this trend, restoring to thinking about law the almost too-obvious
connection between law and violence, argue Sarat and Kearns. 5 Cover
discusses the relationship between law and violence in his essay, Nomos
and Narrative, and more pointedly in his later essay, Violence and the
Word.26 The main thrust of Nomos and Narrative is not, however, the
violence of law, but the law's meaning. Rather than emphasizing law's
difference from other frameworks of meaning, he uses the broader term
"nomos" to point to the similarities and connections. The state's law, like
any other normative system, makes mythic claims for itself and demands
commitment on the part of its adherents. To that extent, the state's law
enjoys no more privilege than any other nomos competing with it. Yet
Cover points out that there is something that makes the state's.. law
different from, for example, the norms of the Mennonite Church: the state
enforces its law with violence. To capture this distinction, Cover creates a
dichotomy between two types of law, one which he calls paideic law and
22. The measures that hinder criminal conviction include a requirement that he or she be warned
before the crime and reject that warning, the limitation of testimony to eye-witnesses, and other
limitations on testimony. See Arnold Enker, Yesodot Ba-Mishpat Ha-Pelili Ha-Ivri, 24
MISHPATIM 178-82 (1994); Aaron Kirschenbaum, The Role of Punishment in Jewish Criminal Law: A
Chapter in Rabbinic Penological Thought, 9 JEWISH L. ANN. 123-26 (1991); Devora Steinmetz,
Crimes and Punishments, Part I.- Mitot Beit Din as a Reflection of Rabbinic Jurisprudence, 55 J. OF
JEWISH STUD. 82 n.4 (2004) [hereinafter Steinmetz, Crimes and Punishments Part I].
23. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan
trans., Vintage Books 1995) (1978). On rabbinic punishments, see BERKOWITZ, supra note 2;
LORBERBAUM, supra note 2; HALBERTAL, supra note 18, at 145-67; SHEMESH, supra note 17;
Steinmetz, Crimes and Punishments, Part I, supra note 22; and Devora Steinmetz, Crimes and
Punishments, Part II" Noachide Law, Brother-Sister Intercourse, and the Case of Murder, 55 J.
JEWISH STUD. 278 (2004).
24. Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Making Peace with Violence: Robert Cover on Law and
Legal Theory, in LAW'S VIOLENCE 215 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992).
25. Id. at 215-16.
26. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983), reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT
COVER 95 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER]; Robert M.




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol17/iss1/7
Berkowitz
the other which he calls imperialist. 27  In the paideic type, people are
bound together by shared narratives, education, and vision. To the extent
that this is so, violence is not necessary to enforce the law, since
participation is based on a sense of common obligation. Cover contrasts
this pattern to the "imperial," marked by its need to enforce norms upon
those who otherwise feel no mutual bonds. The paideic ideal-type, in
short, he identifies with "law as meaning"; the imperial ideal-type is "law
as power. ' 28 Cover insists that in reality neither of these types exists in
pure form; every nomos always consists of elements of both.29
Nevertheless, Cover is emphatic about the radical split between these two
modes: a nomos that is enforced with violence will always be experienced
differently from a nomos that is not.
Yet Cover's attention in Nomos and Narrative is largely taken up with
"law as meaning" and much less with "law as power." The balance of
attention shifts in his essay, Violence and the Word, where his concern is
precisely what makes a violently enforced system of law different from
other networks of meaning. In this essay, Cover bucks an intellectual
trend that honors the literary dimensions of law; indeed, we might include
Cover's own Nomos and Narrative within this trend.3° In Violence and
the Word, Cover reminds his audience of the obvious yet forgotten
difference between law and literature: law takes place, quite literally, in a
field of pain and death.3 Cover points to the fact of law's violence in this
essay, but he is also interested in how exactly law goes about
accomplishing its violence. Cover describes significant cultural and moral
inhibitions that law must overcome: people generally feel constrained
when it comes to inflicting pain on others. Law's solution, submits Cover,
is to disperse responsibility. A social organization of violence is
constructed such that the judge does not have to pull the switch, while the
executioner does not have to bear the weight of the decision to execute. In
this way, both the judge and the executioner are able to do their jobs in
good conscience. Law thus manages to maintain a close connection to
violence without getting too involved in the concrete pain and suffering
caused by its sentences. But in the process, law binds itself to the
organization that translates its word into deed. In other words, a judge
must consider the appearance of legitimacy of her decision to those whom
she expects to carry it out. In Cover's language, legal interpretation
27. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 26, at 105-07.
28. Id. at 112.
29. Id. at 107.
30. Cover describes this scholarly trend, pointing to Ronald Dworkin and J. B. White as
representative. See Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 26, at 204 n.2. He differentiates Nomos
and Narrative from the trend, admitting its emphasis on the "world-building" character of law, but
restricting that essay's scope to lawmaking among small groups.
31. Id. at 203.
2005]
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becomes bonded: the judge is compelled to justify her decision.32 By the
same token, violence gains sanction by its association with the judge's
decision, even if those who carry out the violence must also obey that
decision. In other words, law and violence each gain legitimacy but lose
freedom in their encounter, an encounter that Cover portrays as mutually
beneficial.33 To summarize, the key themes in Cover's thinking on law
and violence are: dispersal of responsibility for violence, law's need for
legitimation, the bondedness of legal interpretation, and, finally, the
domestication of violence, which is, according to Cover, part of law's very
reason for being.
APPLYING COVER TO RABBINIC LAW
How might these themes be relevant to rabbinic law? Let me briefly
address what Cover's own writings suggest. The very categories of nomos
and narrative are borrowed from the world of the Rabbis, from the
halakhah (law or nomos) and aggadah (narrative) interwoven within the
Bible and within the Talmud.34 But I want to consider how Cover
explicitly depicted rabbinic law, when in the course of his reflection on
law he would use the Rabbis as an example. A rabbinic text from the
Mishnah structures the essay Nomos and Narrative; he derives his
dichotomy between paideic law and imperialist law from it.35 It seems
then that for Cover rabbinic law encompasses both law as meaning and
law as power. But when Cover writes of other religious systems in Nomos
and Narrative, they all seem to fit the paideic type: the Mennonites,., the
Amish, the Shakers, the Quakers, the Mormons. And in some of Cover's
other writings, that is also the case for rabbinic law. In Violence and the
Word, the Rabbis appear as martyrs who oppose a coercive legal order.36
In his essay, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order,
Cover acknowledges the coercive mechanisms of Jewish law, yet in the
end differentiates Jewish law from other legal systems with centralized
32. Id. at 223-24.
33. See id. at 236 ("As long as death and pain are part of our political world, it is essential that
they be at the center of the law.... The fact that we require many voices is not, then, an accident or
peculiarity of our jurisdictional rules. It is intrinsic to whatever achievement is possible in the
domesticating of violence.").
34. For one approach to the relationship between law and narrative within the Bible, see the
works of Calum Carmichael, especially CALUM CARMICHAEL, LAW AND NARRATIVE IN THE BIBLE:
THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEUTERONOMIC LAWS AND THE DECALOGUE (1985). See also Pamela
Barmash, The Narrative Quandary: Cases of Law in Literature, 54 VETUS TESTAMENTUM 1 (2004).
On the dialectical relationship between halakhah and aggadah, or law and narrative (loosely
translated) within the Talmud, see the famous essay by the modem Hebrew poet Hayim Nahman
Bialik, Halakhah and Aggadah (Halakhah ve-Aggadah), and JEFFREY L. RUBENSTEIN, TALMUDIC
STORIES: NARRATIVE ART, COMPOSITION, AND CULTURE (1999).
35. MISHNAH, Avot [Fathers] 1:2, 18; Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 26, at 103-04.
36. Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 26, at 206-07.
[Vol. 17:125
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power and autonomous control.37 In that essay's discussion, Jewish law is
most certainly paideic, relying on bonds of mutual solidarity and
obligation in contrast to rights-based western law. Cover's approach may
be due to some of the same concerns discussed above with respect to
scholarship on the rabbinic death penalty-to maintain the moral
relevance of the rabbinic tradition and in so doing to counter Christian,
Reform Jewish, and secular claims that classical Judaism should be either
radically altered or discarded.38 Despite Cover's own approach to Jewish
law, his work can nevertheless do for the study of rabbinics what Sarat and
Kearns argue he did for the study of law: reading rabbinic law through
Cover's eyes suggests that violence plays a more active role than it has
been accorded.
MISHNAH SANHEDRIN CHAPTER Six: THE COURT HOUSE AND THE
STONING HOUSE
Let me try to rewrite Cover on the Rabbis using Cover himself. That is,
instead of looking at rabbinic law as paidea, I want to look at its
imperialist or violent dimensions and apply Cover's themes, particularly
that of law's need for legitimation. To reiterate, according to Cover, law
must establish its proximity to violence in order for it to have the character
of law, but it must also maintain some distance from that violence if it is to
be effective and to appear legitimate. This balance is unusually delicate in
the case of capital punishment, says Cover, since the deed that law
authorizes in such a case is so extreme and irrevocable.39 Let us see how
proximity and distance are drafted into the procedure of criminal
execution outlined by the Mishnah. Here is the first Mishnah of Tractate
Sanhedrin Chapter Six (the full text of this chapter of Mishnah is found in
an appendix):
40
When the judgment has been concluded, they take him out to stone
him. The stoning house41 was" outside the court house,43 as it is
37. Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, in ESSAYS OF
ROBERT COVER 242-43 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1993).
38. On Robert Cover's personal Jewish commitments, see the forty-fifth volume of Conservative
Judaism devoted to his memory, particularly Joseph Lukinsky & Robert Abramson, Robert Cover: A
Jewish Life, 45 CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM 4 (1993).
39. Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 26, at 230.
40. My translation is based on the standard printed edition; I will footnote significant variants
emerging from the Kaufmann manuscript, considered to be the most important manuscript of the
Mishnah. See FAKSIMILE-AUSGABE DES MISCHNA CODEX KAUFMANN A50, pt. 2, 297-98 (1929)
(printed in Jerusalem with the approval of Hungarian Academy of Science in Budapest, under the
supervision of Dr. Georg Beer).
41. Neither the Mishnah nor the Tosefta explains precisely what this structure is. They do discuss
its height: the Mishnah describes the stoning house to be the height of two men, and the Tosefta
comments that the height of the criminal should be added to this measurement rather than included
within it. See MISHNAH, Sanhedrin 6:4; TOSEFTA, Sanhedrin 9:6, MOSHE S. ZUCKERMANDEL,
TOSEFTA: AL PI KITVE YAD ERFURT U-VIYENAH 429 (1963). The preoccupation with height would
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said, "Take out the blasphemer" [Lev. 24:14]. 44  One [person]45
stands at the entrance of the court, and the scarf 6 is in his hand, and
one person 47 rides the horse far enough away from him so that he can
still see him. 48  [If] one says, "I have [some point] to argue for his
innocence," that person waves the scarf, and the horse runs and stops
him. And even if he [himself] says, "I have [some point] to argue for
my own innocence," they bring him back, even four or five times,
only provided that there be substance in his words.49
The text first establishes that the execution site (the "stoning house") must
be distant from the court house, citing Leviticus 24:14, and it then stages a
rescue effort on behalf of the convicted criminal. As he is processed from
the court to the execution site, exonerating evidence is sought in a last-
ditch attempt to reverse the verdict.
suggest that the "stoning house" was intended not as a full-scale building but as a structure or even
platform of a certain height, with the word beyt (house of) in this phrase meant to be taken loosely (the
word bayit is used in rabbinic literature for formal structures but also for various kinds of spaces, like
those within the body-for example, beit ha-beliyah, the esophagus, literally, the "house of
swallowing," beit ha-shehi, the armpit, literally, the "house of the bend"--and also to refer
metaphorically to women).
42. The tenses shift back and forth between past and present within and among all versions of the
Mishnah. It is difficult to know what meaning to make of this, whether the tense shifts are due to the
vagaries of transmission or to a concerted effort on the part of the authors to chronologically locate
this procedure in both the past and present, to attribute it to hoary tradition as well as to claim its
contemporary relevance.
43. Like the stoning "house," the court "house" likely refers to some kind of provisional
structure, though probably more solid and permanent than the stoning house. The seating layout of the
court described in Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:3-4 does not mention an actual courthouse, but the elaboitte'
nature of the seating suggests a housing structure.
44. The Kaufmann manuscript links this sentence with the previous one using the letter vav,
though it appears to be added by a later scribe. The original scribe, in the same place, has added the
article et, seemingly incorrectly, and the later scribe puts a line through the word.
Kaufmann and other early manuscripts (Parma and Paris) quote the verse in a more expanded form:
"Take the blasphemer outside the camp." The abbreviation of later editions makes better sense of the
Mishnah, which is not referring to the Israelite camp. I will presently suggest that the tension between
the legislation and the biblical verse brought as its source is a fault line within the text that invites a
closer reading.
45. 1 have added the words in brackets to make sense of the text, but the words themselves do not
appear in the Mishnah text.
46. Sudarin. Borrowed from the Greek soudarion, though its ending gets confused by
transmitters with a Hebrew plural and is then singularized to sudar in some versions and pluralized to
sudarim. See ELIEZER BEN-YEHUDA, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT AND MODERN HEBREW
(1960). Jastrow associates the word instead with the Hebrew root sameh-dalet-resh.
47. Kaufmann and the other early manuscripts eliminate explicit mention of a second person:
"and the horse is far enough away .... A rider would seem to be implied, however.
48. The manuscripts and printings vary a great deal in their use of articles, e.g., the scarf/a scarf,
the horse/a horse, etc. The definite article gives the procedure a more ritualized feel-the scarf and the
horse set apart for this function-but one runs the risk of over-reading what may be merely scribal
whim.
49. In the Kaufmann manuscript, the first mishnah ends here. In most later versions of the
Mishnah, the individual mishnahs are not divided as in the early manuscripts: the Kaufmann and
Parma manuscripts have twelve mishnahs, with the act of execution taking place squarely in the
middle, in Mishnah Six. The Paris manuscript has eight mishnahs, while the Yemenite manuscript and
printed editions have only six. Although the Kaufmann division has a stronger literary impact, I will
use the standard divisions for convenience of reference.
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The exegesis provided in this Mishnah is somewhat peculiar. In
Leviticus 24:14, God delivers to Moses a command for the community to
stone a blasphemer. God directs the people to perform their stoning
"outside the camp": "Take the blasphemer outside the camp; and let all
who were within hearing lay their hands upon his head, and let the whole
community stone him."5  While the verse quoted requires that the
criminal be taken outside the camp, the Mishnah requires that the criminal
be taken outside the court. Why does the Mishnah use the verse as a basis
for its directive, when the verse's execution site is different from that of
the verse?5
Cover's work allows us to make sense of the Mishnah's hermeneutics.
While Leviticus takes the execution outside the camp perhaps to avoid the
future corpse spreading impurity, the Mishnah takes the execution outside
the court, I would speculate, because its concern is to define the proper
relationship between the court and its consequences, between legal word
and violent deed. In its shift from "outside the camp" to "outside the
court," the Mishnah transforms the Bible's procedure into a ritual of the
court whose impact is to amplify and dramatize the connection between
the rabbinic judge and the sentence he issues.52
The Mishnah begins with the words nigmar ha-din (when the judgment
has been concluded). The procedure begins with one foot in the court,
with the decision of the court and the language of the court. The
procedures then move towards the stoning house for the execution, upon
which the bulk of the Mishnah is focused. But with the last two mishnahs
of the chapter, Mishnahs Five and Six, the procedure returns to the court:
And they would not bury him in the graves of his fathers, but rather
50. Leviticus 24:14. 1 use the JPS translation. See JPS Hebrew-English Tanakh: the Traditional
Hebrew Text and the New JPS Translation (1999).
51. The Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 42b), noticing the difference between the law and the
verse, asks: "And the stoning house was outside the court house? And not more?" Though the last
sentence is absent in some Talmud manuscripts, it helps to explain the Talmud's question: according
to the Mishnah's quoted verse, the place of stoning is not only outside the court, but outside the whole
camp. The Talmud proposes an explanation for the Mishnah's prescription: "And that which the
Mishnah teaches, the following can be derived from it: if the court goes out and sits outside the three
camps, then we should [still] make the stoning house outside the court in order that the court not
appear to be murderers, or else, in order that there should be rescue." Id. According to the Talmud's
resolution of the discrepancy, the Mishnah is giving two prescriptions: (1) that the site of execution be
outside the Israelite camps, and (2) that the site of execution be outside the court. Thus, if the court for
some reason is moved outside the camps, the court must still be distant from the site of execution.
Through this resolution, the Babylonian Talmud shows the Mishnah both to be following the verse and
to be injecting its own concerns for the court's reputation and the criminal's life.
Halivni points out problems in the Talmud's interpretation. First, the discrepancy between the
Mishnah's law and the Mishnah's verse still stands. Second, according to the Sifra, the court must be
inside the camp. The Talmud's interpretation, however, hypothesizes that the court might situate itself
outside the camp. See David Weiss Halivni, The Location of the Bet Din in the Early Tannaitic
Period, 29 PROC. OF THE AM. ACAD. FOR JEWISH RES. 181 (1960-61).
52. On looking at the Mishnah's procedure of criminal execution as a ritual, see
BERKOWITZ, supra note 2, ch. 3.
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two gravesites 53 were prepared for the court, one for those executed
by decapitation and strangulation, and one for those executed by
stoning and burning.54 When the flesh is consumed, they gather the
bones and bury them in their place. 5' And the relatives come and ask
after the welfare of the judges and the welfare of the witnesses, 56 that
is to say,57 that we have nothing in our hearts against you, that you
judged a judgment of truth. And they would not mourn with full
ceremonies, but they would mourn the day of the death, since
mourning the day of the death58 is only in the heart.59
A separate burial is prescribed for the criminal, not in the gravesite of his
fathers but in "gravesites (in the printed edition of the Talmud, literally
"houses of graves") prepared for the court. '6°  The criminal, now as a
53. Batei qevarot, though many versions have only qevarot. See SAMUEL KRAUSS, THE
MISHNAH TREATISE SANHEDRIN 16 n.12 (1909); RAPHAEL NATHAN RABBINOVICZ, DIQDUQEI
SOFRIM/VARIAE LECTIONES (1977) (on BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 46a, n.90). The difference
in terminology may reflect two different modes of burial found in rabbinic sources, the former
referring to burial buildings, the latter referring to burial in the ground. See the explanation of terms in
Joseph Patrich, Qevurah Rishonah al-Pi Meqorot Hazal-le-Vi 'uram Shel Munahim, in QEVARIM VE-
NOHAGEI QEVURAH BE-ERETS YISRA'EL BE-ET HA-ATIQAH 191-93 (Itamar Singer ed., 1994).
54. The order is awkward, since the couplets of punishments are presented with the more lenient
first, but within the couplets, the more severe punishment is first. The Kaufmann manuscript's order
works better contextually, following the severe-to-lenient order of execution methods presented at the
beginning of the next chapter of Mishnah: "one for those executed by stoning and by burning, and one
for those executed by decapitation and by strangulation." See KRAUSS, supra note 53, at 16 n.13;
RABBINOVICZ, DIQDUQEI SOFRIM, supra note 53, at 46a, n. 100.
55. Bi-meqoman. Also in the Paris manuscript and the Talmuds. See MISHNA CODEX PARIS 328-
329 (1973). The Kaufmann manuscript and others have ba-maqom. One manuscript of the
Babylonian Talmud has "in the graves of his fathers," which I would argue is an alteration based on
the Babylonian Talmud's interpretation. For further discussion of the location of a criminal's burial,
see BERKOWITZ, supra note 2, ch. 4.
56. The order of witnesses and judges is reversed in Kaufmann and other early manuscripts, but
presented this way by the Yemenite manuscript and the Mishnah in the Talmuds. The order would
seem to determine whether more emphasis is placed on the judges who give the guilty verdict or the
witnesses on whose testimony that verdict is based.
57. The Parma manuscript adds here de'u, ("that is to say, you should know that we have
nothing"), Mishna Codex Parma 138 (1970). Some versions leave out ke-lomar, ("that is to say"),
suggesting a direct quotation rather than an explanation of what the relatives say to the court.
58. Aninut. The word appears in Kaufmann and other early manuscripts as aninah. A dispute
over the definition of aninut is reported in the Palestinian Talmud. According to Rabbi Judah the
Patriarch, it refers to the period from death until burial, while according to the anonymous consensus,
it refers to the day of the death. PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Pesahim 8:8 (36a-b); PALESTINIAN TALMUD,
Sanhedrin 2:1 (20a). I translate aninut according to the anonymous consensus opinion. See DAVID
KRAEMER, THE MEANINGS OF DEATH IN RABBINIC JUDAISM 28-29 (2000); NISSAN RUBIN, QETS HA-
HAYIM: TIQSEI QEVURAH VE-EVEL BI-MEQOROT HAZAL, ANTROPOLOGIYAH SHEL HA-TALMUD 104-
05 & n.3 (1997) (discussing aninut). On customs of full mourning, avelut, which this Mishnah
contrasts with aninut, see KRAEMER, supra, at 31-32, and RUBIN, supra, at 160-89.
59. MISHNAH, Sanhedrin 6:5-6.
60. On Jewish burial customs in the rabbinic period, see KRAEMER, supra note 58, at 48-71;
QEVARIM VE-NOHAGEI QEVURAH BE-ERETS YISRA'EL BE-ET HA-ATIQAH (Itamar Singer ed., 1994);
RUBIN, supra note 58; Gedaliah Alon, Burial Customs in Early Israel, 9 BULL. OF THE JEWISH
PALESTINE EXPLORATION SOC. 107, 107-12 (1941). The Talmud explains that the reason for separate
burial is that "one should not bury a wicked person next to a righteous one." BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
Sanhedrin 57a. The Talmud also addresses the reason for dividing the criminals themselves into
separate burial plots, referring to the Mishnah's hierarchy of executions, running from stoning and
burning for the most serious crimes to decapitation and strangulation for capital crimes considered less
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corpse, makes his way back to the court, so to speak, which, in a final act
of appropriation, refuses to hand the body over to the family.61 The
procedure closes with the relatives making a reconciliation with the court.
The execution thus begins and ends with the court house, after a long
detour through the stoning house. Through this symmetry, the Mishnah
emphasizes the link between the court and the execution. The rabbinic
judge's word is shown to have a strong relationship to deed.
DISTANCING WORD FROM DEED
Yet according to Cover, the judge's word must also be clearly separate
from deed. And indeed, the Mishnah does begin with the requirement that
judge and execution be literally, spatially, distant from each other. The
Mishnah chooses Leviticus as its source, I would suggest, because other
legal traditions of the Bible, particularly those from Deuteronomy,
threaten too great a proximity or even identity between court house and
stoning house.62 Deuteronomic deaths tend to take place "within" rather
than "without," such as in the case of the execution of an idolater in the
following passage: "You shall take the man or the woman who did that
wicked thing out to the public place [el she'arekha, literally: to your
gates], and you shall stone them, man or woman, to death. 63 The verse
severe. According to the Talmud, following a similar logic as the one for separate burial, "[O]ne
should not bury a severely wicked person next to a less wicked person." Id. Given that the Mishnah
establishes four execution methods with four different degrees of severity, the anonymous talmudic
editor asks: Why does the Mishnah not establish four different graveyards instead of two? The
Talmud's response is that the establishment of two criminal graveyards is an inherited tradition. This
talmudic commentary, it should be kept in mind, likely emerged centuries after the Mishnah and may
or may not represent the Mishnah's own logic, which the Mishnah itself typically does not reveal.
61. Separate burials can also be found in conjunction with medieval European executions, after
which the criminal was buried in grounds adjacent to the church: "Those who died in the hands of the
law were excluded permanently." Esther Cohen, "To Die a Criminal for the Public Good": The
Execution Ritual in Late Medieval Paris, Law, in CUSTOM, AND THE SOCIAL FABRIC IN MEDIEVAL
EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF BRUCE LYON 285, 294 (Bernard S. Bachrach & David Nicholas eds.,
1990). After executions in early modern England and the Netherlands, the corpses of criminals were
given to the anatomy room or exposed on the gallows. Burial with one's community was a major
concern for criminals in Europe well into the eighteenth century according to Pieter Spierenburg. See
PIETER SPIERENBURG, THE SPECTACLE OF SUFFERING: EXECUTIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF
REPRESSION 90 (1984).
62. The Palestinian Talmud addresses the conflict between the Mishnah and Deuteronomic
execution; see Sanhedrin 6:1(23b). Also see the commentary attributed to the Ran, matnitin, and the
Tosafot, ki heykhi, and HAYYIM BENVENISTE, HAMRA VE-HAYYEI 163-69 (1959), on Babylonian
Talmud, Sanhedrin 42b.
The Mishnah's apparent neglect of Deuteronomy can also be explained hermeneutically: Halivni
suggests that the Mishnah follows the readings of Deuteronomy found in the Targum and Midrash
Tannaim that these verses are prescribing the site of judgment, not the site of execution. Thus when
the Mishnah requires the execution to take place outside the court, it is in fact incorporating these
Deuteronomic verses which equate the place of judgment with the city's gates. See David Weiss
Halivni, The Location of the Bet Din in the Early Tannaitic Period, 29 PROC. OF THE AM. ACAD. FOR
JEWISH RES. 181 (1960-61).
63. Deuteronomy 17:5. Deuteronomy 13:10-12, referring to the execution of the enticer to
idolatry, does not specify any location, nor does Deuteronomy 17:12 for the man who acts
presumptuously, or Deuteronomy 19:19 for the false witness.
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directs the idolater to be taken to the public place, which in biblical times
was located at the gates of the city.64  Deuteronomy 21:19-21,
commanding the execution of a rebellious son, likewise locates the
execution at the public place. Deuteronomy 22:21, which directs the
community to stone a betrothed woman who has had intercourse, locates
the execution at the door of her father's house, since her sin challenges his
authority and damages his reputation. These execution locations, the
public square or the private house, are either identical to or not explicitly
distant from the location of judgment, in marked contrast to the priestly
author's "outside the camp." By choosing the priestly verse as its
prooftext, the Mishnah is able to create distance between the two sites in
its procedure, the court house and the stoning house, or, reading it through
Cover's perspective, the judges and the violence they authorize.
The Mishnah goes on to emphasize this distance in various ways. First,
it makes a long and labored procession from the court house to the stoning
house. The beginning of the Mishnah-"they take him out to stone
him"-is deceptive, because there is a continual possibility of a return to
the court, with the stoning never taking place. The rescue team is ready, at
a moment's notice, to bring the criminal back. Anyone may argue for the
convicted man's acquittal,65 and the Mishnah allows even the man himself
to argue on his own behalf, "even four or five times" (by which the
Mishnah means "even many times"). The Mishnah provides in the town
crier yet one more opportunity for the criminal to be brought back to
court: "And anyone who knows [an argument] for his innocence, let him
come and argue for him." The language of the Mishnah also confirms the
reluctance to move away from the court. Even when describing the
execution once it has progressed outside the court, the Mishnah borrows
language from inside the court, phrases it used in the previous chapter to
legislate court procedure, such as: "I have [some point] to argue for his
innocence," "they bring him back," "provided that there be substance in
his words," "if they found him innocent, they exonerated him," "let him
come and argue on his own behalf."
Not only does the procedure resist moving away from the court house,
but it also is reluctant to move towards the stoning house. The second and
third Mishnahs begin by marking the criminal's distance from the stoning
house: "When he was about ten cubits' distance from the stoning house,
64. For a discussion of Deuteronomy 6:9, see JEFFREY H. TIGAY, THE JPS TORAH COMMENTARY:
DEUTERONOMY 79 (1996).
65. Rashi and the Meiri, important medieval Talmud commentators, diverge in their
interpretation of the Mishnah on this point: according to Rashi (Solomon ben Isaac, 1040-1105), the
Mishnah permits any of the judges to argue on the convicted person's behalf, while according to the
Meiri (Menahem ben Solomon, 1249-1316), the Mishnah permits anyone in the community to do so.
See Benveniste's discussion of their positions, where he asks why the flag-waver does not just stand
on high so that the horse-rider would not be necessary, BENVENISTE, HAMRA VE-HAYYEI, supra note
62, at 162-63 (matnitin ve-ha-sus).
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they say to him, 'Confess' . . . . When he was four cubits' distance from
the stoning house, they took off his clothes." It is not until Mishnah
Four-"the stoning house was the height of two men"-that the criminal
reaches the stoning house. The repetitive rhetoric of the preceding
mishnahs contributes to a ritualized slowdown, creating a series of delays,
heightening the suspense, now along literary lines, using its character as
text to reinforce the drama. Cover's work would suggest that by
emphasizing the long distance between the court and the stoning house,
the Rabbis show themselves to be reluctant authorities who are not
intimately or eagerly involved in the implementation of their decisions.
As Cover points out, "[O]ur judges do not ever kill the defendants
themselves. They do not witness the execution.... The most elementary
understanding of our social practice of violence ensures that a judge know
that she herself cannot actually pull the switch. '66 In the Mishnah's terms,
"the stoning house is outside the court house." Paradoxically, the constant
stops and starts might also have the opposite effect, emphasizing the ever-
present link between the court house and the stoning house. Indeed, this
mixed message-word and deed are distant, word and deed are closely
linked-is precisely what Cover suggests is the key to law's efficacy.
The shift from a horizontal to a vertical axis of movement for the act of
execution itself also has a distancing effect, in that it may imply that God,
not the rabbinic judges, is responsible. Mishnahs One, Two, and Three,
which detail the departure from the court and the approach to the stoning
house, take place along a horizontal axis: the convicted man, the horse-
rider, and the herald all move between point A, the court house, and point
B, the stoning house. But Mishnah Four, describing the act of execution,
shifts abruptly to a vertical axis-the primary movements are pushing
from a high platform and dropping a heavy stone:
One of the witnesses pushes him on his hips (from the platform); [if]
he turns over onto his heart, he flips him over onto his hips. And if
he dies thereby, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if not, the second
[witness] takes the stone and sets it on his heart. If he dies thereby,
66. Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 26, at 229, 234. Spierenburg writes similarly of
late medieval/early modem European executions: "The highest authority did not associate itself
directly with violent death on the scaffold." SPIERENBURG, supra note 61, at 54. The distance of the
judges from the execution is found in a description of a ceremony of execution in Amsterdam, in a
manuscript circa 1660 by Hans Bontemantel treating Amsterdam's government. According to his
description, "the magistrates come into the justice-room once again and kneel in prayer, together with
the prisoners and the preacher. After this they return to the windows and watch the sentences being
executed." Id. at 46-47. Conforming to Cover's theory, the judges of Amsterdam are distanced as
well as linked to the execution-they remain near the execution, watching it, but from a window. An
execution similar to the one described by Bontemantel is found pictorially in a woodcut printed in
Paris in 1541. See Mitchell Merback's reproduction and description: "The judges and magistrates,
their work now done, have withdrawn from the scene and taken up positions in first-floor windows."
MITCHELL B. MERBACK, THE THIEF, THE CROSS, AND THE WHEEL: PAIN AND THE SPECTACLE OF
PUNISHMENT IN MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE EUROPE 142 (1998).
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he has fulfilled his obligation.
67
There are many speculations regarding the basis for this strange
execution procedure.68 I want to focus for the moment on the type of
action it prescribes: both movements are "passive aggressive." It is not
the act itself that causes the death-the push-but rather the effects of the
act-the fall. Moreover, the potential failure of the act to kill the
convicted criminal (if he dies thereby ... but if not.. . ) suggests that the
act is not entirely lethal; the execution procedure thus implies, in yet
another way, that the executioner is not fully responsible for the criminal's
death, as I will discuss further below. After the death act, the procedure
continues along its vertical axis with the hanging of the body:
How do they hang him? They sink the beam into the ground, and the
wood comes out from it; they place his hands one on top of the other,
and they hang him. Rabbi Yose says: The beam is inclined against
the wall, and they hang him on it the way that the butchers do. And
they loosen him immediately...
The Mishnah here presents a sequence of up-and-down motions
surrounding the criminal's death: the body is taken up for stoning; the
body falls; the stone falls; the body is taken up for hanging; the body is
taken down. David Kertzer characterizes certain judicial rituals in small-
scale societies as "taking the highly charged power of determining guilt in
interpersonal disputes away from individuals and assigning it to some
extra-human agency."69 By shifting from a horizontal to a vertical axis,
67. The Paris manuscript of the Mishnah has the first witness both pushing the criminal and also
dropping the stone. If the criminal still has not died, only then does the second witness come and
repeat the stone drop: "One of the witnesses pushes him on his hips; if he turns over onto his heart, he
flips him over onto his hips. If he dies, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if not, he takes the stone
and sets it on his heart. If he dies thereby, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if not, the second
witness takes the stone and sets it on his heart. If he dies thereby, he has fulfilled his obligation. But
if not, his stoning is by all of Israel. ... This version is found also in the Naples printing, the
Palestinian Talmud's Mishnah, and in some traditions of the Babylonian Talmud. See RABBINOVICZ,
supra note 53 (on Sanhedrin 45a, n.9).
68. The Mishnah subsequently quotes Deuteronomy 17:7 as the source for the procedure, or at
least, for the primacy of the witnesses in it: "Let the hands of the witnesses be the first against him to
put him to death, and the hands of the people thereafter." Also see the parallel in Sifre Numbers 114 in
SIPHRE D'BE RAB 123 (H. Saul Horovitz ed., Shalem 1992) (1917). The procedure is also
hermeneutically linked in rabbinic literature to Exodus 19:12-13, where God prohibits the Israelites
from ascending or even touching Mount Sinai before revelation, directing the Israelites to stone or
shoot (with a slingshot) anyone who does. See Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishma 'el Maskheta de-Ba-Hodesh,
in 3 MECHILTA D'RABBI ISHMAEL 212-13 (H. Saul Horovitz & Israel A. Rabin eds., 1960); Mekhilta
d'Rabbi Simon b. Jochai 141 (Mekhilta de-Rashbi et al. eds., 1955); and BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
Sanhedrin 45a-b. In the Babylonian Talmud the procedure is also linked to Leviticus 19:18: "[L]ove
your neighbor as yourself." Sanhedrin 45a.
Cohn argues that the driving force of this procedure is a rabbinic desire to eliminate all traces of
vindicta publica. See Cohn, supra note 18, at 65. Halbertal has more recently argued that the
intention of the Rabbis in this procedure is to preserve the form of the human body, which the Rabbis
construed quite literally to be fashioned in the image of God. See HALBERTAL, supra note 18, at 145-
67.
69. DAVID I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND POWER 133 (1988).
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the Sages may be symbolically implying that divine agency, not their own,
lies behind the act of execution.7" As Meiselman concludes from his study
of the rabbinic death penalty, "the human court becomes the agent for
God's punishment."'" Displacing the human judge with the divine
perhaps marks the ultimate separation between a judge and the violence he
legislates.
THE ACCIDENTAL EXECUTION
I have just explored how the geography of the Mishnah's procedure
distances the judge's word from the deed it produces. Indeed, I have
suggested that all agency is obscured in rabbinic execution, by the judge
or anyone else, and I would refer to Cover's claim that responsibility for
law's violence is habitually dispersed. This becomes particularly clear in
the case of rabbinic execution if we examine this chapter of Mishnah in its
larger literary context in tractate Sanhedrin. If we juxtapose the execution
procedure in Mishnah Sanhedrin Chapter Six with the legal definition of
intentional homicide in Mishnah Sanhedrin Chapter Nine, we find that the
Mishnah sharply differentiates execution from intentional killing.
Mishnah Sanhedrin 9:1 makes a distinction between different types of
homicidal actions: "A homicide who strikes his neighbor with a stone or
an iron tool, or holds him down in the water or in the fire, and he cannot
get up from there and he dies-he (the homicide) is guilty [of intentional
homicide]. He pushes him in the water or in the fire, and he can get up
from there and he dies-he (the homicide) is exempt [from punishment for
intentional homicide]." This Mishnah identifies the intentional homicide
as one who actively strikes someone with a heavy weapon such as a stone
or iron, or alternatively someone who holds another person down in water
or fire. The text contrasts this with the unintentional homicide, who
merely pushes another into water or fire. In Mishnah Chapter Six, the
witness-executioners seem to fall into the latter camp: they push the
criminal (from a height rather than into water or fire) instead of striking
him or holding him down. In fact, the same verb is used for unintentional
homicide in Chapter Nine that is used for the death act of the witnesses in
Chapter Six: dahaf (push). This confirms our sense that the executioners
70. Besides Cover, others have noted the tendency of executions to disperse or veil responsibility.
Smith quotes one Missouri official stating that the advantage of Missouri's lethal injection machine
lies in its ability to "spread out the responsibility." Brian K. Smith, Capital Punishment and Human
Sacrifice, 68 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 3, 10 n.6 (2000). Foucault talks about the dispersal of
responsibility in modem European punishment: "Small-scale legal systems and parallel judges have
multiplied around the principal judgment: psychiatric or psychological experts, magistrates concerned
with the implementation of sentences, educationalists, members of the prison service, all fragment the
legal power to punish." FOUCAULT, supra note 23, at 21.
71. Moshe Meiselman, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law, 8 GESHER 23, 26 (1981). And later:
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of Chapter Six are not intentional agents of homicide.
Mishnah Sanhedrin 9:1 distinguishes not only between types of actions
but also between the effects of those actions. If the victim cannot rise,
then the homicide is guilty of intentional murder, whereas if the victim can
rise, even if he ultimately dies, the homicide is guilty only for
unintentional homicide. Here, too, the witness-executioners of Mishnah
Sanhedrin Chapter Six seem to fit into the second category. Chapter Six
suggests, with each act of execution except the final one by the
community, that the criminal could theoretically survive the execution: "If
he dies ... if not . . . ." Thus, the execution of Chapter Six should be
classified, according to Chapter Nine, as unintentional or accidental
homicide-in other words, not murder.
Mishnah Sanhedrin 9:2 deals more explicitly with the homicide's
intention:
He intended to strike him on his hips and there was not enough
[force] in it to kill him on his hips, [except the strike] goes onto his
heart and there is enough [force] to kill him on his heart, and he
dies-he is exempt.
He intended to strike him on his heart and there is enough [force] to
kill him on his heart, [except the strike] goes onto his hips and there
is not enough [force] to kill him on his hips, and he dies-he is
exempt.
But he intended to strike on his hips and there is enough [force] to
kill on his hips, [except the strike] goes onto his heart, and he dies-
he is guilty.
This Mishnah outlines three possibilities of homicide. In the first case, the
homicide does not intend to kill his victim but accidentally does so. This
type of homicide is given exemption from punishment. In the second case
mentioned by this mishnah, the homicide does indeed mean to kill, but he
makes a mistake, striking his victim on a less vulnerable part of the body
than he had intended. If the one who is struck dies anyway, the homicide
is exempt because his strike must not have been the direct cause of death.
While in this second case the homicide does have homicidal intention, he
cannot be held accountable because his attack cannot be directly linked to
his victim's death. We can deduce from these two cases that the Mishnah
requires the fulfillment of two conditions for culpability: intention and
clear causation.72 The Mishnah's last case provides both, even though the
homicide makes a mistake in this case as well. This mistake is different,
72. For analysis of the early rabbinic laws of homicide, see Jonah Ostrow, Tannaitic and Roman
Procedure in Homicide, 48 JEWISH Q. REv. N.S. 352 (1957-58) & 52 JEWISH Q. REV. N.S. 160, 245
(1961-62), reprinted in 4 STUD. JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE 211 (1976). For analysis of the laws of
homicide in the biblical period, see PAMELA BARMASH, HOMICIDE IN THE BIBLICAL WORLD (2004).
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however, because the homicide's act can still be shown to be the direct
cause of death.
Chapter Nine provides a revealing backdrop to Chapter Six. Like
Chapter Nine, Chapter Six focuses attention on the hearts and hips of the
person killed, repeating the phrases al libo (on his heart) and al motnav
(on his hips). Chapter Nine's presumption that the heart is the more
vulnerable location tells us that in Chapter Six, when the first executioner
targets not the heart but the hips, he does not strictly "intend" to kill him.
And though the killer of Chapter Nine's last case does kill his victim by
striking him on the hips, the first executioner of Chapter Six merely
pushes him on the hips (albeit on an elevated platform). Moreover, the
killer of Chapter Nine's second case intends to strike (le-hakoto) his
victim on the heart, while the second executioner of Chapter Six merely
drops (notnah) onto the heart. The Mishnah of Chapter Six seems to ape
Chapter Nine, proving that execution is indeed homicide, but the "good"
kind, that is, unintentional or accidental. Through these parallels, the
Mishnah differentiates between execution and murder by associating
execution with accidental death.73
AN ARGUMENT FOR AUTHORITY
I have been emphasizing the spatial and conceptual distance that the
Mishnah puts between the court house and the stoning house. But it is
important to remember the Mishnah's simultaneous emphasis on their
proximity. Cover writes: "Judges are both separated from, and
inextricably linked to, the acts they authorize."74 In other words, the judge
is not a legitimate judge if her words are not separate from the power of
deed, but the judge is only a legitimate judge if her words have the power
of deed. Though the execution cannot take place only with a judge,
neither can the execution take place without a judge. In the Mishnah's
terms, if the court house is not linked to the stoning house, it is not a court
house but simply a house of scholars or thinkers. If the court house is also
a stoning house, then the judges themselves turn into criminals.
73. On state efforts to differentiate execution from murder, see AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE
KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION 65 (2001) ("[T]he legal construction of
state killing, while it appears to reveal empathy or identification between the state and those it kills,
works primarily to differentiate state killing from murder."). Also see Smith's discussion of the
ritualization of capital punishment: "Indeed, ritualized death is made to appear as unlike killing in the
extra-ritual world as possible." Smith, supra note 70, at 11. Smith describes, for instance, the
medicalizing of execution so that pain and torture are eliminated. These efforts inevitably can fail-
for example, the criminal is not killed immediately or the executioner is himself endangered by the
execution method. On technical difficulties in American executions, see Errol Morris's documentary
film MR. DEATH: THE RISE AND FALL OF FRED A. LEUCHTER, JR. (Lions Gate Films 1999) (designer
of execution equipment is eventually co-opted by the Holocaust denial movement). On botched
executions, see FOUCAULT, supra note 23, at 51-53. These mistakes can obviously become the basis
for criticism of the death penalty and, by extension, the authority who administers it.
74. Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 26, at 235.
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The Mishnah's geography creates this double-sided argument for
authority. The basis of that authority's legitimacy is, on one side, its
distance from the stoning house, the slowing down of execution, the
vertical axis of action, the differentiation of execution from intentional
homicide. All these features point to an authority that is self-restrained,
reluctant to exercise violence. But the basis of rabbinic authority's
legitimacy is at the same time its capacity to exercise violence. By linking
the court house to the stoning house yet not identifying them, the Mishnah
gives to the word of the rabbinic judges its "homicidal potential," to use
Cover's expression.75 The Mishnah argues for the authority of rabbinic
Law through these laws of execution, through the play of proximity and
distance between the court house and stoning house. If this Cover-
influenced approach to the Mishnah, emphasizing rabbinic law's pursuit of
legitimacy through its careful structuring of capital punishment, may be
just one reading, at the very least it is strikingly similar to the reading
given by the Babylonian Talmud, which explains the distance between the
site of judgment and the site of execution as emerging out of the concern
not to have the rabbinic court "look like murderers."76  The Talmud's
unspoken assumption is that the rabbinic court has the ability to kill if it
wants to.
THE POWER TO PUNISH
The Talmud's assumption, however, is surprising, given that in the
Talmud the claim is made that the power of criminal punishment was
withdrawn from the Jews forty years prior or at the time of the destruction
of the Second Temple, before the rabbinic period had even begun. 7' Based
on the talmudic evidence as well as historiography of Roman Palestine in
75. Id. at 214.
76. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 42b. See also supra note 51.
77. On the Talmud's claim that criminal jurisdiction was revoked, see BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
Sanhedrin 41alShabbat 15a/Avodah Zarah 8b/Rosh Hashanah 31 a; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin
52b; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 30b/Sotah 8b/Sanhedrin 37b; PALESTINIAN TALMUD,
Sanhedrin 1:1 (1 8a), 7:2 (24b). The Jewish court's criminal competence in late antiquity has been
extensively discussed (largely because of its relevance to the execution of Jesus). See I RAYMOND
BROWN, THE DEATH OF THE MESSIAH: FROM GETHSEMANE TO THE GRAVE: A COMMENTARY ON THE
PASSION NARRATIVES IN THE FOUR GOSPELS 363-72 (1994); LORBERBAUM, supra note 2, at 98 n.1 1;
JAMES S. MACLAREN, POWER AND POLITICS IN PALESTINE: THE JEWS AND THE GOVERNING OF THEIR
LAND, 100 B.C.-A.D. 70, 88-101 (1991); HUGO MANTEL, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE
SANHEDRIN 254-302 (1961); ALFREDO MORDECHAI RABELLO, HA-YEHUDIM BA-IMPERIAH HA-
ROMIT BE-RE'I HA-HAQIQAH [BE-IQVOT MEHQARO SHEL JEAN JUSTER] 82 & n.28 (1987); Ephraim E.
Urbach, Batei-Din Shel Esrim u-Sheloshah Ve-Dinei Mitot Beit-Din, in FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS OF
JEWISH STUDIES 40 n.13 (P. Peli ed., 1972); Gedaliah Alon, Towards an Investigation of the Halakhah
of Philo [Criminal Law Before the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem], 5 TARBIZ 28 (1924) & 6 TARBIZ 241
(1925) (Hebrew); Gerald Blidstein, Capital Punishment-the Classic Jewish Discussion, 14
JUDAISM 159, 170-71 n.23 (1965); Isaac Rabinowitz, The Meaning and Date of Damascus Document
a, 1, 6 REVUE DE QUMRAN 433-36 (1968); Paul Winter, Sadoqite Fragments IX, 1, 6 REVUE DE
QUMRAN 131-36 (1967); Paul Winter, The Trial of Jesus and the Competence of the Sanhedrin, 10
NEW TESTAMENT STUD. 494-99 (1964).
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this period, it remains a matter of more than some doubt whether the
Mishnah's procedure for capital punishment was ever implemented,
indeed, whether much of the Mishnah's entire set of legislations was ever
implemented in its own time.78 If the legislators who authored the
Mishnah assumed a set of political conditions in which they were unable
to carry out the death penalty, surely that would alter our reading of the
role that violence plays. Indeed, according to Cover, a legal system
without the competence to exercise violence encounters a "crisis of
credibility"; the law comes to represent an ideal whose function is far
removed from the regulation of people's everyday lives.7 9 Cover suggests
that "such a dichotomy has immense implications if built into the law."8
But we should observe that the Mishnah does not, in fact, build such a
dichotomy into its law, at least in theory. If we read the Mishnah without
reference to subsequent talmudic commentary or to historiography of
second-century Roman Palestine, we find little hint of obstacles to
implementation.8 The Mishnah does not ask its audience to see its death
penalty in a context of disempowerment; it represents itself, quite
shockingly given our knowledge of the period, as a perfectly legitimate
and practiceable law code. One of the few allusions to a problem of
practice is in fact in the text I cited in my opening, when Rabbis Tarfon
and Akiva speak in the subjunctive: "if we had been in the Sanhedrin."
Otherwise, one must wait for the talmudic commentary to learn of the
Roman abrogation of Jewish criminal law. In the Mishnah's vision of law,
it seems, legal interpretation does "take place in a field of pain and death."
78. The current scholarly consensus views the Rabbis of second-century Jewish society in
Palestine as a small, informally organized group struggling for authority in a political structure in
which their exercise of power depended on persuasion. See MARTIN GOODMAN, STATE AND SOCIETY
IN ROMAN GALILEE, A.D. 132-212 (1983); CATHERINE HEZSER, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
RABBINIC MOVEMENT IN ROMAN PALESTINE (1997); LEE LEVINE, THE RABBINIC CLASS OF ROMAN
PALESTINE IN LATE ANTIQUITY (1989); SETH SCHWARTZ, IMPERIALISM AND JEWISH SOCIETY: 200
B.C.E. TO 640 C.E. (2001); Shaye Cohen, The Rabbis in Second-Century Jewish Society, in 3 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JUDAISM 922-90 (William Horbury et al. eds., 1999). This recent
historiography forsakes the tendency to retroject later rabbinic institutionalization onto the early
period.
79. Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 26, at 222.
80. Id. at 223.
81. Historians of criminal jurisdiction in the Roman provinces emphasize the power of the
Roman governor and the Roman Emperor. See Peter Garnsey, The Criminal Jurisdiction of
Governors, 58 J. ROMAN STUD. 51, 51-55 (1966); Peter Garnsey, Why Penal Laws Become Harsher:
The Roman Case, NAT. L. FORUM 141 (1968); Ramsay MacMullen, Judicial Savagery in the Roman
Empire, 16 CHIRON 147-66 (1986). Nevertheless, the Jewish communities of Palestine likely had a
limited degree of judicial autonomy. For reconstructions that suggest that Jews had some criminal
jurisdiction, see Alfredo M. Rabello, Jewish and Roman Jurisdiction, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW 144 (N.S. Hecht et al. eds., 1996); Peretz Segal, Jewish Law
During the Tannaitic Period, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW 103-
04 (N.S. Hecht et al. eds., 1996). If the Jews of second-century Palestine did have some limited,
negotiated degree of local judicial autonomy, it still does not tell us anything about the small group of
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A rabbinic judge's word does theoretically have the power to kill. The
Mishnah's procedure of execution, whether or not it ever truly translated
into deed, is about the palpable and potent relationship between rabbinic
word and violent deed.
Nevertheless, Cover himself might have argued that if the Mishnah was
never translated into deed then it should not be considered law, but
literature. What distinguishes law from literature, Cover insists in
Violence and the Word, is that it contains a real and enforceable threat of
violence. Without that, the text can at best be compared to a very
compelling novel. But in this hypothetical dialogue with Cover I would
caution that we not underestimate the vividness the Mishnah may have
had within the probably small circles in which it was authored and
transmitted, even while keeping in mind the difference between actual
executions and literary ones.8 2  Perhaps the peculiar character of the
Mishnah as a law code that could barely be practiced in its own time
provides us with an opportunity to challenge Cover's opposition between
law and literature. The Mishnah seems to partake of both genres, or
neither: it looks more like a law code but it acted more like literature. The
Mishnah invites us to try to synthesize Cover in Nomos and Narrative
with Cover in Violence and the Word, to find the ways that literature may
have its own consequential discourse of violence not so different from or
unrelated to that of law.
NOMOS AND NARRATIVE: NEW DIRECTIONS
Cover himself may overlook or suppress the violence of rabbinic law.
This aversion may be part of a larger problem in Cover's work on
violence, which, according to Sarat and Kearns's critique, functions partly
as an apology for law's violence.83 But his: writings do invite us to
scrutinize more carefully if not even more critically than Cover himself
the violence that attends Jewish law. The rethinking of the relationship
between rabbinic law and violence can happen along several lines: first,
the question must be asked again, in light of recent historiographical
advances of the historical reality of rabbinic coercion, from the earliest
rabbinic period, the second-century tannaitic period discussed here,
through the subsequent amoraic period of the third, fourth, and fifth
centuries, and into the period of the talmudic redactors afterwards, in both
the major rabbinic communities of Palestine (now Israel) and Babylonia
(now Iraq). Any consideration of rabbinic law's relationship to violence
must be grounded in the most recent, plausible, and sophisticated
82. See supra note 78 on the argument that the second-century Rabbis were a small, informally
organized subculture within Jewish Palestine.
83. See Sarat & Keams, supra note 24.
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historical reconstructions of that law's coercive potential. With an
adequate reconstruction of the socio-political conditions, we can begin to
cross-read, to try to better understand the dialectical relationship between
rabbinic law and ancient Jewish society.
The second and related front for rethinking rabbinic legal violence is the
rabbinic legal texts themselves. We should look at the discourse of
rabbinic violence, the mechanisms for social control that the Rabbis
interpret or invent to accompany their law. This would include corporal,
capital, and monetary punishments, both those meant to be imposed by the
rabbinic courts and those the Rabbis claim to be imposed by God.
Following Cover's model, we should consider this discourse to include
both laws and narratives of coercion. Cover's work would have us ask
about this discourse: how does rabbinic law position itself vis A vis its own
potential for violence? Cover's configurations of law and violence can
help us to explore the multiplicity of ways in which rabbinic law
incorporates and advocates violence but also, alternately, strategically
repudiates it; as I have tried to show, this can happen all in one penal
procedure. Cover's work helps us to move beyond the romantic view of
the Rabbis as impossibly enlightened proto-abolitionists and allows us to
take them more seriously as lawmakers vigorously seeking legitimacy
within the competing nomoi of their day. Cover's discussions suggest that
the negotiations between word and deed that we find in the rabbinic
procedure of capital punishment are utterly characteristic of law, whose
legitimacy is threatened when it gets either too close to or too far from
violence. Moreover, Cover's conception of an "imperial" nomos inspires
us to ask about the context of Roman imperial law, and how Roman law's
brand of violence may have shaped the violence developed by rabbinic
law.84 Cover's work reveals that law's coercive potential is not incidental,
but central, and that law's meaning cannot be divorced from law's
violence. His struggle with the violent dimensions of modem state law
can serve as a model for us to struggle also with the violence of ancient
Jewish law.
84. See BERKOWITZ, EXECUTION AND INVENTION, supra note 2, ch. 5 (discussing rabbinic
execution in the context of Roman execution).
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APPENDIX
MISHNAH SANHEDRIN CHAPTER SIX
8 5
1. When the judgment has been concluded, they take him out to stone
him. The stoning house was outside the court house, as it is said, "Take
out the blasphemer" (Lev. 24:14). One [person] stands at the entrance of
the court, and the scarf is in his hand, and one person rides the horse far
enough away from him so that he can still see him. [If] one says, "I have
[some point] to argue for his innocence," that person (with the scarf at the
entrance to the court) waves the scarf, and the horse runs and stops him.
And even if he [himself] says, "I have [some point] to argue for my own
innocence," they bring him back, even four or five times, only provided
that there be substance in his words.
[If] they found him innocent, they exonerated him, but if not, he goes
out to be stoned. And the herald goes out before him, "Person So-and-So,
the son of So-and-So, goes out to be stoned because he has committed
such-and-such a transgression, and So-and-So and So-and-So are his
witnesses. And anyone who knows [an argument] for his innocence, let
him come and argue for him."
2. When he was about ten cubits' distance from the stoning house, they
say to him: "Confess." For it is the manner of those about to be put to
death to confess, for everyone who confesses has a portion in the world to
come. For thus we find with Akhan, that Joshua said to him: "'My son,
pay honor to the Lord, the God of Israel, and make confession to Him,"
etc. "And Akhan answered Joshua, 'It is true, I have sinned against the
Lord, the God of Israel. This is what I did,"' etc. (Josh. 7:19-20). And
from where [do we know] that his confession atoned for him? As it is
said, "And Joshua said: 'What calamity you have brought upon us! The
Lord will bring calamity upon you this day."' (Josh. 7:25)-"this day" you
have calamity brought upon you; you do not have calamity brought upon
you for the world to come.
And if he does not know to confess, they say to him: "Say 'may my
death be atonement for all my sins."' Rabbi Judah says: If he knew that he
was conspired against, he says, "May my death be atonement for all my
85. This translation is based on the printed edition of the Mishnah, but I have inserted a line space
where the Kaufmann manuscript divides the chapter. See Faksimile-Ausgabe des Mischna Codex
Kaufmann A50, supra note 40. The words in brackets are implied in Hebrew and have been added to
smooth the translation. The words in parenthesis are my own explanations.
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sins except for this sin." They said to him: If so, every person [will] say
this in order to clear themselves.
3. When he was four cubits' distance from the stoning house, they took
off his clothes. The man-they cover him in his front, and the woman-in
her front and in her back; the words of Rabbi Judah. And the Sages say:
The man is stoned naked, but the woman is not stoned naked.
4. The stoning house was the height of two men. One of the witnesses
pushes him on his hips; [if] he turns over onto his heart, he flips him over
onto his hips. And if he dies thereby, he has fulfilled his obligation. But
if not, the second [witness] takes the stone and sets it on his heart. If he
dies thereby, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if not, his stoning is by all
of Israel, as it is said, "Let the hands of the witnesses be the first against
him to put him to death, and the hands of the people thereafter" (Deut.
17:7).
All those who are stoned are hanged; the words of Rabbi Eliezer. And
the Sages say: Only the blasphemer and idolater are hanged. The man-
they hang him his face towards the people, and the woman-her face
towards the tree; the words of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Sages say: The man
is hanged, but the woman is not hanged.
Rabbi Eliezer said: "But did not Shimon ben Shetah hang women in
Ashqelon?" They said to him: He hanged eighty women, and one does not
judge two [people] in one day.
How do they hang him? They sink the beam into the ground, and the
wood comes out from it; they place his hands one on top of the other, and
they hang him. Rabbi Yose says: The beam is inclined against the wall,
and they hang him on it the way that the butchers do. And they loosen
him immediately; and if they delay, they transgress a negative
commandment regarding him, as it is said, "You must not let his corpse
remain on the stake overnight, but must bury him the same day. For an
impaled body is an affront to God," etc. (Deut. 21:23). That is to say, why
is this [man] hanged? Because he blessed the Name, and the name of
Heaven is found to be profaned.
5. Rabbi Meir said: When a person suffers, Shekhinah, what does the
tongue say? As it were, my head is heavy; my arm is heavy. If thus the
Maqom (God) suffers over the blood of the wicked that is spilled, how
much more so over the blood of the righteous.
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And not only this but everyone that delays his dead [from burial]
transgresses a negative commandment. But if one delayed it for his honor,
to bring him a coffin and shrouds, one does not transgress regarding him.
And they would not bury him in the graves of his fathers, but rather two
gravesites were prepared for the court, one for those executed by
decapitation and strangulation, and one for those executed by stoning and
burning.
6. When the flesh is consumed, they gather the bones and bury them in
their place. And the relatives come and ask after the welfare of the judges
and the welfare of the witnesses, that is to say, that we have nothing in our
hearts against you, that you judged a judgment of truth. And they would
not mourn with full ceremonies, but they would mourn the day of the
death, since mourning the day of the death is only in the heart.
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